Today's post is by UM & Global blogmaster Dr. David W. Scott, Mission Theologian at the General Board of Global Ministries. The opinions and analysis expressed here are Dr. Scott's own and do not reflect in any way the official position of Global Ministries.
The announcement two weeks ago that the Centrist and Progressive negotiators behind the Protocol of Reconciliation and Grace through Separation no longer supported that legislation was received as a major development in the on-going struggle for the future of The United Methodist Church. But to fully understand that announcement and its aims and implications for the church, one must look past a binary understanding of current UMC politics.
As I have argued before, new issues in the UMC have resulted in a variety of coalitions and interest groups. To view UMC controversies as driven solely by a liberal/conservative dyad is an oversimplification, though one Americans are apt to make, given the shape of current US politics.
In this particular instance, it is important to understand the difference between US Centrists/Progressives and US Institutionalists, their interests, and the interests of US Traditionalists. It is the dynamic between these three groups that is behind this announcement, though other groups outside of the United States are critically important for what will happen in its wake, as I will lay out in a future post.
To begin with, US Traditionalists would like to leave the denomination and to do so as quickly, easily, and cheaply as possible. However, without the Protocol or any other plan of separation, quick, easy, and cheap exit paths are not universally available. Despite some negotiations this March between Traditionalists and US bishops, no universal exit path was agreed upon. This created a patchwork of different annual conference procedures for disaffiliation, some cheaper, some more expensive.
This left some US Traditionalists feeling “stuck” in the UMC, as Tom Lambrecht put it in late April. Therefore, in early May, the WCA resolved to continue to advocate within the UMC for the Protocol and better exit terms generally for those Traditionalists stuck in the UMC.
Traditionalists have blamed Centrists/Progressives for keeping them stuck in the UMC. To some extent, that may be fair. There are some Centrists/Progressives who are stuck in conflict and unwilling to let Traditionalists go without making them pay for the pain they’ve caused in the eyes of these Centrists/Progressives.
But a better read of the story would make a distinction between Centrists/Progressives, as represented by prominent pastors and General Conference delegates, and Institutionalists, as represented by many US bishops. These two groups have different motivations regarding a Traditionalist exit, and that difference is key to understanding the announced withdrawal from the Protocol.
While there are some Centrists/Progressives that want to make Traditionalists pay as they leave the denomination, the major force that is acting to keep Traditionalists in is Institutionalists, mainly in the form of bishops and cabinets. Institutionalists, as their name suggest, are motivated to protect and preserve the institutions of the church, including their financial health. They tend to be comfortable with the status quo.
Thus, Institutionalists have a dual incentive to make Traditionalist departure difficult and expensive: It protects the financial interests of the annual conferences to require significant payments or to keep on-the-fence congregations in the denomination to continue to contribute apportionments. And it also preserves the status quo as much as possible to keep as many congregations as possible.
Centrists/Progressives, however, do not have preserving the status quo as their main goal. Instead, they would like to make changes to the rules and structures of the UMC (to create a “Next” UMC), and the continued presence of Traditionalists in the UMC is a hindrance to making those changes. Therefore, Centrists/Progressives have an incentive to let Traditionalists go, though they also want to make sure that departure does not significantly damage the denomination in the process so that there is a sufficiently strong remaining church to lead into their envisioned new day.
This is where the Protocol announcement comes in. Centrists/Progressives realized that, given the high costs they were being asked to pay in some annual conferences, sufficient Traditionalists were likely to stay in the UMC until 2024 that it would reduce the possibilities for using that General Conference to focus on creating a constructive path forward for the denomination and would instead ensure a fight over disaffiliation that might likely fail to resolve the issue to anyone’s satisfaction.
This is the scenario that Centrist/Progressive delegates Rebekah Miles and David Livingston contemplate in a UMNS commentary published the same day as the announcement about the end of Centrist/Progressive support for the Protocol. Miles and Livingston argue that to avoid such a debacle, it is important for parties to recognize how bad their “best alternative to negotiated agreement” is. In other words, parties are much more likely to negotiate when they consider what might happen if they don’t.
In this context, the announcement of the end of Centrist/Progressive support for the Protocol is not necessarily a new development. That lack of support has been voiced behind closed doors for some time. Instead, making such lack of support public sends a message. The Protocol announcement sends messages from Centrists/Progressives to both Traditionalists and to Institutionalists.
By publicly rescinding support from the Protocol, Centrists/Progressives are saying to Traditionalists that they should seriously consider the possibility that they won’t get a better exit deal by waiting until 2024 and advocating for passage of the Protocol. Therefore, Centrists/Progressives are calling on Traditionalists to either take the terms currently available or renegotiate apart from the Protocol.
At the same time, Centrists/Progressives are calling on Institutionalists to allow Traditionalists to leave on minimally expensive terms. The Protocol announcement stated, “We, therefore, implore bishops, district superintendents, and conference trustees [i.e., Institutionalists] to facilitate amicable departures after congregations pay their required pension liabilities.”
Miles and Livingston summarize the dual message thus: “We believe that Paragraph 2553 provides a reasonable path for local churches to disaffiliate. United Methodist annual conferences should uniformly adopt the minimum standards in 2553. Excess demands by leaders in The United Methodist Church delay departures and increase hostility. At the same time, churches and clergy that plan to exit the denomination should use the existing processes to do so before it expires on Dec. 31, 2023. Promises by the Wesleyan Covenant Association to remain active in The United Methodist Church at least through 2024 increase hostility, undermine negotiations, and hinder them from focusing on their mission.”
Both Traditionalists and Institutionalists (in the form of the bishops) initially publicly rebuffed this message from Centrists/Progressives. In a post for the WCA, Jay Therrell claimed the negotiators were acting in bad faith and then reiterated the usual Traditionalist litany of ways they have been victims of evil Centrists/Progressives (including bishops). This response was to be expected. Traditionalists have spent so much time advocating for and defending the Protocol that they could not be expected to accept its death quietly.
On the other hand, the bishops involved in the Protocol reiterated their public support for it. That announcement protects them from the criticisms of the WCA and allows them to preserve the status quo of the abeyance on church trials. At the same time, in its final paragraph, the announcement holds open the door to possible further negotiations among Traditionalists, Centrists/Progressives, and Institutionalists, without taking leadership in calling for such negotiations.
The real question is what US Traditionalists and US bishops will actually do in response to this message from the Centrists/Progressives beyond their initial written responses. Will bishops decide (individually or as a whole) to let Traditionalists go with minimal expenses? Will Traditionalists be willing to take the terms of BOD Paragraph 2553 and exit by the end of 2023? Will both parties be willing to open up further negotiations with Centrists/Progressives?
It is more likely, and easier, for US disaffiliation to be resolved through compromises between Institutionalists and Traditionalists at the US annual conference level. A negotiated compromise would require including not only the three US groups described in this piece but also various groups from outside the United States. That process would be more difficult, but potentially yield additional benefits in terms of resolving questions about the church outside the United States. I will explore that possibility in a future post.
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Showing posts with label Protocol. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Protocol. Show all posts
Wednesday, June 22, 2022
Wednesday, May 25, 2022
African United Methodists and the Protocol in 2024
Today's post is by UM & Global blogmaster Dr. David W. Scott, Mission Theologian at the General Board of Global Ministries. The opinions and analysis expressed here are Dr. Scott's own and do not reflect in any way the official position of Global Ministries.
Zimbabwean Traditionalist UMC leader Rev. Forbes Matonga recently wrote a piece entitled "Waiting in Africa: The Impact of the Postponement of General Conference." That piece plus additional remarks made by Matonga and others on a recent episode of the WCA's podcast offer fruitful material for thinking about how various African United Methodists may approach the 2024 General Conference.
In the podcast, Matonga states what Bishop Quire of Liberia has previously stated and what Bishops Quire, Kasap, and Yohanna reiterated over the weekend at an Africa Initiative event: Africans allied with US Traditionalists intend to remain in the UMC until the 2024 General Conference. In the podcast, Congolese Traditionalist UMC leader Kimba Evariste expresses a personal desire to leave the denomination before then, which is notable, but the overall Africa Initiative strategy seems to be to stay in the denomination and to push for adoption of the Protocol, as Matonga indicates in his article.
In his article, Matonga expresses confidence that, backed by African support, the Protocol will pass. He correctly notes that if delegate numbers are recalculated between now and General Conference 2024, that recalculation will benefit African influence at the expense of American influence. Based on that math and an assumption that the same global coalition that has turned out for Traditionalist initiatives in the past will turn out for the Protocol in 2024, Matonga confidently asserts that the Protocol will pass.
But Matonga's second assumption bears questioning. As is made more fully clear in the podcast, Matonga is expecting all Africans, most to all Filipinos, all Eastern Europeans, and US Traditionalists to vote together for the Protocol. This is the coalition of votes that has preserved traditional stances on marriage in the UMC Book of Discipline in recent decades.
But Matonga misses the important point that the Protocol is a different issue that the denomination's official teaching on sexuality, and the same coalition will not necessarily support the Protocol just because they believe that marriage should be between a man and a woman.
Matonga himself notes that the number of US Traditionalists at General Conference will be lower than in past years. This will be especially true if Traditionalists leave the denomination and the new delegates are elected, but based on election results for 2020, it will be true regardless.
As Jonathan Razon of the Philippines makes clear in the podcast, Filipino bishops are currently effectively promoting the idea of unity among Filipino United Methodists, including General Conference delegates. A vote for the Protocol could likely be seen as a vote against unity and therefore unacceptable to Filipino voters. Hence, Filipino voters seem less likely to support the Protocol than to support a traditional definition of marriage.
While the Bulgaria-Romania Provisional Annual Conference voted to leave the UMC (and thereby taking their two General Conference votes with them), the indication is that most to all other European branches of the church outside the Eurasia episcopal area intend to stay in the church and thus may be uninterested in the Protocol. Critically, that includes areas of Eastern Europe such as Poland and Estonia that are traditional on questions of marriage but may not be in support of the Protocol.
Then we come to Africa itself. I have yet to hear an African suggest that they would welcome a change in the denomination's teachings on sexuality. However, as the past three years have made clear, there are a variety of African views on the denomination's future that are not at all determined by their (unanimous) opposition to gay marriage and gay ordination.
The Africa Initiative is clearly aligned with US Traditionalists in promoting the Protocol. But even Jerry Kulah of the Africa Initiative was initially critical of the Protocol, and Evariste's remarks indicate that there may be some groups allied with the Africa Initiative that find it difficult to keep up the fight for the next two years and instead leave the UMC in their own mini-schisms.
Moreover, as much as the Africa Initiative would like to present themselves as the sole voice of African United Methodists, the past several years have shown they are at best one of several. African bishops remain a strong force, though views of the Protocol among them seem to vary. Some bishops have expressed allegiance towards US Traditionalists; others have moved against WCA-aligned leaders in their conferences.
The Africa Voice of Unity and the Christmas Covenant network represent two other, largely overlapping, groups of African leaders and General Conference delegates that seem to oppose the Protocol. The extent of this group and its opposition to the Protocol is further indicated by African signatories to the "A Call to Grace" letter.
Thus, with fewer US Traditionalists, without much support by Filipinos, with a few less votes from Eastern Europe, and with less solid support by Africans, the Protocol is unlikely to pass by the force of the same coalition that has prevailed at the previous several General Conferences. If it is to pass, it needs to draw on additional voters.
That does not, however, mean that the Christmas Covenant or a change in denominational stances on gay marriage and gay ordination are likely to pass. On the latter question of denominational teachings on sexuality, there is every reason to believe that the old coalition holds on this question. And because the Christmas Covenant requires a supermajority to pass constitutional amendments, there may be enough of the old coalition that hangs together on this issue to block its passage, as Matonga suggests.
The main takeaways here are two:
First, church observers need to start decoupling UMC leaders' views on sexuality and their views on the future of the UMC. Those are two very different questions that do not promote the same set of answers. Instead, one should think of the UMC as being dominated by a new set of denominational issues that creates a new set of denominational factions.
Second, without clear coalitions among these new denominational factions and with conflicting answers across different factions on different issues, there is a strong possibility that the 2024 General Conference will not accomplish anything major. As much as the denomination is beset by problems crying out for answers, divided factions along with entrenched conflict may mean that no major legislation comes out of General Conference 2024, further hollowing out the church.
Zimbabwean Traditionalist UMC leader Rev. Forbes Matonga recently wrote a piece entitled "Waiting in Africa: The Impact of the Postponement of General Conference." That piece plus additional remarks made by Matonga and others on a recent episode of the WCA's podcast offer fruitful material for thinking about how various African United Methodists may approach the 2024 General Conference.
In the podcast, Matonga states what Bishop Quire of Liberia has previously stated and what Bishops Quire, Kasap, and Yohanna reiterated over the weekend at an Africa Initiative event: Africans allied with US Traditionalists intend to remain in the UMC until the 2024 General Conference. In the podcast, Congolese Traditionalist UMC leader Kimba Evariste expresses a personal desire to leave the denomination before then, which is notable, but the overall Africa Initiative strategy seems to be to stay in the denomination and to push for adoption of the Protocol, as Matonga indicates in his article.
In his article, Matonga expresses confidence that, backed by African support, the Protocol will pass. He correctly notes that if delegate numbers are recalculated between now and General Conference 2024, that recalculation will benefit African influence at the expense of American influence. Based on that math and an assumption that the same global coalition that has turned out for Traditionalist initiatives in the past will turn out for the Protocol in 2024, Matonga confidently asserts that the Protocol will pass.
But Matonga's second assumption bears questioning. As is made more fully clear in the podcast, Matonga is expecting all Africans, most to all Filipinos, all Eastern Europeans, and US Traditionalists to vote together for the Protocol. This is the coalition of votes that has preserved traditional stances on marriage in the UMC Book of Discipline in recent decades.
But Matonga misses the important point that the Protocol is a different issue that the denomination's official teaching on sexuality, and the same coalition will not necessarily support the Protocol just because they believe that marriage should be between a man and a woman.
Matonga himself notes that the number of US Traditionalists at General Conference will be lower than in past years. This will be especially true if Traditionalists leave the denomination and the new delegates are elected, but based on election results for 2020, it will be true regardless.
As Jonathan Razon of the Philippines makes clear in the podcast, Filipino bishops are currently effectively promoting the idea of unity among Filipino United Methodists, including General Conference delegates. A vote for the Protocol could likely be seen as a vote against unity and therefore unacceptable to Filipino voters. Hence, Filipino voters seem less likely to support the Protocol than to support a traditional definition of marriage.
While the Bulgaria-Romania Provisional Annual Conference voted to leave the UMC (and thereby taking their two General Conference votes with them), the indication is that most to all other European branches of the church outside the Eurasia episcopal area intend to stay in the church and thus may be uninterested in the Protocol. Critically, that includes areas of Eastern Europe such as Poland and Estonia that are traditional on questions of marriage but may not be in support of the Protocol.
Then we come to Africa itself. I have yet to hear an African suggest that they would welcome a change in the denomination's teachings on sexuality. However, as the past three years have made clear, there are a variety of African views on the denomination's future that are not at all determined by their (unanimous) opposition to gay marriage and gay ordination.
The Africa Initiative is clearly aligned with US Traditionalists in promoting the Protocol. But even Jerry Kulah of the Africa Initiative was initially critical of the Protocol, and Evariste's remarks indicate that there may be some groups allied with the Africa Initiative that find it difficult to keep up the fight for the next two years and instead leave the UMC in their own mini-schisms.
Moreover, as much as the Africa Initiative would like to present themselves as the sole voice of African United Methodists, the past several years have shown they are at best one of several. African bishops remain a strong force, though views of the Protocol among them seem to vary. Some bishops have expressed allegiance towards US Traditionalists; others have moved against WCA-aligned leaders in their conferences.
The Africa Voice of Unity and the Christmas Covenant network represent two other, largely overlapping, groups of African leaders and General Conference delegates that seem to oppose the Protocol. The extent of this group and its opposition to the Protocol is further indicated by African signatories to the "A Call to Grace" letter.
Thus, with fewer US Traditionalists, without much support by Filipinos, with a few less votes from Eastern Europe, and with less solid support by Africans, the Protocol is unlikely to pass by the force of the same coalition that has prevailed at the previous several General Conferences. If it is to pass, it needs to draw on additional voters.
That does not, however, mean that the Christmas Covenant or a change in denominational stances on gay marriage and gay ordination are likely to pass. On the latter question of denominational teachings on sexuality, there is every reason to believe that the old coalition holds on this question. And because the Christmas Covenant requires a supermajority to pass constitutional amendments, there may be enough of the old coalition that hangs together on this issue to block its passage, as Matonga suggests.
The main takeaways here are two:
First, church observers need to start decoupling UMC leaders' views on sexuality and their views on the future of the UMC. Those are two very different questions that do not promote the same set of answers. Instead, one should think of the UMC as being dominated by a new set of denominational issues that creates a new set of denominational factions.
Second, without clear coalitions among these new denominational factions and with conflicting answers across different factions on different issues, there is a strong possibility that the 2024 General Conference will not accomplish anything major. As much as the denomination is beset by problems crying out for answers, divided factions along with entrenched conflict may mean that no major legislation comes out of General Conference 2024, further hollowing out the church.
Monday, June 7, 2021
Recommended Reading: On the UMC trust clause in Africa
This blog has explored the system of UMC assets and how they might be impacted by a separation of the church. In a post in April, the Africa Voice of Unity blog has added an important central conference perspective to that conversation. In a piece entitled, "How UMC 'Trust Clause' and Impending Tussle over Assets Could Collapse the 'Protocol'," the author notes an important different in the legal context between many Western nations and many African nations. The author asserts that there are different understandings of and thus laws around trusteeship. These differences could lead to lawsuits over property in African countries, even under the provisions of the Protocol, which might avoid lawsuits in the United States. It seems that the risk for such lawsuits is greatest in countries in which there are different factions that want to stay and leave and thus control of assets becomes a contested issue. One of the argument of the UM & Global series on UMC assets was that there is a great risk for lawsuits in any division. It is interesting to hear that same concern raised in contexts other than the United States.
Wednesday, February 3, 2021
Regionalization Would Have Prevented Some Problems with Delaying General Conference 2020
Today's post is by UM & Global blogmaster Dr. David W. Scott, Mission Theologian at the General Board of Global Ministries. The opinions and analysis expressed here are Dr. Scott's own and do not reflect in any way the official position of Global Ministries.
The General Conference that was scheduled to meet in May 2020 has already been delayed once and may be forced to be delayed a second time or transition to an alternative technology-mediated format. There have been a variety of challenges associated with these postponements, from the administrative to larger questions about the future of the denomination.
At this point, the denomination must find a way forward from this situation in which it finds itself. Yet it is worth point out that greater regionalization of the denomination would have prevented some problems stemming from delaying General Conference. The possibility of a church split in the United States best illustrates how regionalization could have reduced the challenges of delaying General Conference.
One of the major pieces of legislation before General Conference, whenever it next meets, is the Protocol for Reconciliation and Grace through Separation. This proposal, which is the result of mediated negotiation among mostly US United Methodist leaders from across the theological spectrum, would pave the way for the exit of Traditionalist churches with a $25 million payment to help found a new denomination. Traditionalist churches in the United States have been increasingly restive to leave the denomination in the fallout of General Conference 2019, when it became clear that Centrists and Progressives would not abide by the provisions of the Traditional Plan passed at that event.
Even amid the pandemic, Traditionalists remain focused on passing the Protocol in 2021, despite questions about whether and how General Conference will meet. They have even suggested that General Conference should convene just to take up the single issue of the Protocol. Yet the longer it is until General Conference meets, the more time there is for the negotiated consensus behind the Protocol to collapse or challenges to come from other corners, such as the African bishops.
The challenge, of course, is that passing the Protocol requires General Conference to meet, since there is no polity structure for the United States capable of implementing the Protocol within the United States, and there are numerous logistical challenges to bringing together delegates from around the world, either in person or digitally, to implement the Protocol globally.
If, however, there was a regional structure that had the ability to make some budgetary, policy, and legal decisions for the UMC in the United States, that body could potentially take up the issue of church separation in the United States. A special meeting of a US regional structure could have provided for such separation, satisfying Traditionalists' calls for a speedy departure, even if larger questions about the global connection remained.
While a schism may extend to the entire global connection, the greatest pressure for a legal and financial separation comes from within the United States. Since the United States funds 99% of the denomination's budget, it might have been possible to arrange a payout within the United States alone. And the logistical and health questions surrounding a United States-only meeting are much easier to handle than the international meeting that is General Conference.
Of course, such a regional structure does not currently exist. But it could.
The Christmas Covenant, the first major legislative package originating in the central conference, would create a system of regionalization within the UMC that would allow regional contexts, including the United States, greater flexibility in handling their own missional and administrative affairs.
It is too late for such a system of regionalization to mitigate the issues associated with delaying General Conference 2020. Passing the Christmas Covenant is not necessary to pass the Protocol, if indeed the latter does pass.
But it is not too late to implement a system of regionalization to give the church greater flexibility to adapt to the next crisis facing one of its branches. The Christmas Covenant represents one opportunity to do so.
The General Conference that was scheduled to meet in May 2020 has already been delayed once and may be forced to be delayed a second time or transition to an alternative technology-mediated format. There have been a variety of challenges associated with these postponements, from the administrative to larger questions about the future of the denomination.
At this point, the denomination must find a way forward from this situation in which it finds itself. Yet it is worth point out that greater regionalization of the denomination would have prevented some problems stemming from delaying General Conference. The possibility of a church split in the United States best illustrates how regionalization could have reduced the challenges of delaying General Conference.
One of the major pieces of legislation before General Conference, whenever it next meets, is the Protocol for Reconciliation and Grace through Separation. This proposal, which is the result of mediated negotiation among mostly US United Methodist leaders from across the theological spectrum, would pave the way for the exit of Traditionalist churches with a $25 million payment to help found a new denomination. Traditionalist churches in the United States have been increasingly restive to leave the denomination in the fallout of General Conference 2019, when it became clear that Centrists and Progressives would not abide by the provisions of the Traditional Plan passed at that event.
Even amid the pandemic, Traditionalists remain focused on passing the Protocol in 2021, despite questions about whether and how General Conference will meet. They have even suggested that General Conference should convene just to take up the single issue of the Protocol. Yet the longer it is until General Conference meets, the more time there is for the negotiated consensus behind the Protocol to collapse or challenges to come from other corners, such as the African bishops.
The challenge, of course, is that passing the Protocol requires General Conference to meet, since there is no polity structure for the United States capable of implementing the Protocol within the United States, and there are numerous logistical challenges to bringing together delegates from around the world, either in person or digitally, to implement the Protocol globally.
If, however, there was a regional structure that had the ability to make some budgetary, policy, and legal decisions for the UMC in the United States, that body could potentially take up the issue of church separation in the United States. A special meeting of a US regional structure could have provided for such separation, satisfying Traditionalists' calls for a speedy departure, even if larger questions about the global connection remained.
While a schism may extend to the entire global connection, the greatest pressure for a legal and financial separation comes from within the United States. Since the United States funds 99% of the denomination's budget, it might have been possible to arrange a payout within the United States alone. And the logistical and health questions surrounding a United States-only meeting are much easier to handle than the international meeting that is General Conference.
Of course, such a regional structure does not currently exist. But it could.
The Christmas Covenant, the first major legislative package originating in the central conference, would create a system of regionalization within the UMC that would allow regional contexts, including the United States, greater flexibility in handling their own missional and administrative affairs.
It is too late for such a system of regionalization to mitigate the issues associated with delaying General Conference 2020. Passing the Christmas Covenant is not necessary to pass the Protocol, if indeed the latter does pass.
But it is not too late to implement a system of regionalization to give the church greater flexibility to adapt to the next crisis facing one of its branches. The Christmas Covenant represents one opportunity to do so.
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